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Introduction
We live at a time when the question of secession is at the forefront of 
international attention. As well as the current focus on Catalonia, the 
subject of Kurdish independence is also in the news. Meanwhile, the 
question of Scottish independence remains firmly on the agenda, despite 
the referendum that took place in 2014. Elsewhere around the world, 
there are anywhere up to a hundred other groups and territories seeking 
statehood.
Although significant attention is paid to the ways in which secessionist 
territories pursue their ambitions for independence, there has been rather 
less attention given to the way states facing an act of unilateral secession 
respond to such challenges. In many ways, the small eastern Mediterranean 
island of Cyprus has set the standard for states facing a secessionist threat. 
Over the course of the last thirty years, the Cypriot government has been 
engaged in a relentless – and, it must be said, often ruthless – battle to 
prevent the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TNRC)” (or Northern 
Cyprus, as it is more commonly known), from gaining international 
recognition. By most benchmarks, these efforts have been extremely 
successful. While some international measures have been taken to ease 
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, especially after the failed reunification 
attempt in 2004, Northern Cyprus still has relatively little interaction 
with the wider world. In analysing the ways the Cypriot government has 
responded to the TRNC, it becomes clear that any successful counter-
secession strategy is based on four separate but interlocking strands. 
The Cyprus problem
In 1960, the small Mediterranean island of Cyprus became independent 
after 82 years of British colonial rule. A complex constitution was put 
in place that balanced power between the majority Greek Cypriots, 
representing 78% of the population, and the small Turkish Cypriot 
community representing 18% of the island’s inhabitants. (The final 4% was 
made up of three small religious communities: the Maronites, Armenians 
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and Latins.) Meanwhile, the sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity of the new state were guaranteed by the United Kingdom, Greece 
and Turkey. Despite hopes that the new state could work, the power-
sharing agreement soon broke down. In December 1963, fighting erupted. 
This led to the creation of a United Nations peacekeeping force (UNFICYP). 
However, the Turkish Cypriots had ceased to be a part of the government 
structures and the Republic of Cyprus had effectively become a Greek 
Cypriot entity.
During the ten years that followed, Cyprus was relatively calm. Tensions 
between the two communities subsided as the Turkish Cypriots withdrew 
into enclaves. This was broken when, in July 1974, the Greek government 
ordered a coup to overthrow the country’s leader with the hope of uniting 
Greece and Cyprus. In response, Turkey ordered a military invasion of 
the island. After a month of heavy fighting Cyprus was left divided. 
At first, the stated plan of the Turkish Cypriots was to pursue a federal 
settlement. In 1977, the United Nations brokered an agreement between 
the leaders of the two communities that any future settlement would 
be based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation. This was reconfirmed in 
1979. However, on 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriot authorities, 
seizing on political turmoil in Turkey, unilaterally declared independence, 
announcing the creation of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. 
Turkey immediately recognised the new state. However, the move was just 
as quickly condemned by the UN Security Council, which declared the UDI 
illegal and called on states not to recognise the Turkish Cypriot entity. And 
no country has done so. Meanwhile, the UN has continued with its efforts 
to reunite the island. In 2004, a major initiative led to a referendum on 
reunification, which was rejected by the Greek Cypriots. The latest two-year 
effort collapsed in July 2017 following almost two weeks of intensive talks 
in the Swiss mountain resort of Crans-Montana.
The four pillars of the counter-secession strategy
Ever since the Turkish Cypriots declared independence, the government 
of Cyprus has gone to extraordinary lengths to ensure that the TRNC is 
neither officially recognised nor unofficially accepted on the world stage. 
In doing so, it is utterly uncompromising in its approach. No move, no 
matter how small, that could in any way be understood to amount to 
an “upgrading” of the Turkish Cypriot state can pass unchallenged. 
As one diplomat once noted, it is as if they have an army of officials 
watching for any move that suggests that the Turkish Cypriot state 
is gaining recognition. He was not far wrong. The entire diplomatic 
machinery of the republic is geared up to watch out for anything that 
could be understood to amount to legitimisation of the Turkish Cypriot 
entity. In broader terms, the Greek Cypriot approach is built around four 
elements. In many ways, these have become a blueprint for any other 
territory seeking to counter an attempt by part of its territory to secede. 
1) Maintain the claim to territory
The first element of any counter-secession strategy is to ensure that the 
world knows that the attempted secession is unacceptable. As Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht, the esteemed international lawyer, once observed, while 
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a state facing an act of secession may tacitly accept that a territory has 
been lost, it will often wait decades to acknowledge this reality in formal 
terms. This means that other countries will often watch how the parent 
state (as the state from which the territory is seceding is most usually 
known) reacts to an act of secession when deciding how they should 
respond to the situation. If it appears as if the parent state has accepted 
the secession, and is merely waiting to recognise the new state of affairs, 
it is more likely that other states will chose to recognise it, or at least 
interact with it freely. For this reason, the most important first step is 
to challenge the purported secession and indicate clearly and in no 
uncertain terms that it has an ongoing claim to the territory.
There are numerous ways in which a parent state can indicate its 
opposition to a declaration of independence. Perhaps the most 
obvious is to issue a decree or a parliamentary resolution annulling 
the purported secession. For extra measure, the ringleaders may be 
charged with treason. Both actions send out a clear message. Beyond 
this, the emphasis must be on maintaining that the territory is still 
considered to be an integral part of the state. In the case of Cyprus, this 
is done in many ways. For instance, there are still MPs in the parliament 
representing the areas “under occupation”. However, it also goes far 
further than this. Cyprus even maintains local councils for these districts. 
Of course, these are only skeletal bodies with no actual territorial 
responsibilities. However, the fact that they even exist sends out the 
message that the state still regards the areas they represent or “govern” 
as essential and inalienable parts of their sovereign territory.
2) Prevent recognition
The second element of the strategy is the most obvious: to prevent other 
states from formally recognising the breakaway territory, and stop the 
territory from joining international organisations. In this task, parent 
states are aided by the deep aversion of the international community 
to accepting unilateral acts of secession. In fact, since 1945, only one 
country has seceded without permission and gained full international 
recognition: Bangladesh. However, even in this case, it only joined the 
UN after it had been recognised by Pakistan. Every other secessionist 
territory has fared far worse. Even Kosovo, which seceded from Serbia in 
2008, and is widely regarded as the most successful contemporary act of 
unilateral secession, has only been recognised by a little over half of the 
members of the United Nations a decade later. While it has been able 
to join some international organisations, full UN membership is highly 
unlikely for the foreseeable future due to objections from Russia and 
China.
However, while states are extremely reluctant to recognise unilateral acts 
of secession, it is still important for parent states to make their case. This 
requires an active diplomatic campaign. However, this can be expensive 
and beyond the means of many countries. In such cases, states need to 
concentrate their firepower where it will achieve the most results. In this 
context, the UN General Assembly can often be a vital chance to engage 
with as many other states as possible. Meetings of other international 
and regional bodies can also be ideal opportunities to lobby. For Cyprus, 
its membership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) gave it access to 
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many developing countries. Although it had to relinquish membership 
of the NAM when it joined the European Union, EU membership has 
proven to be an incredibly powerful tool in the Cypriot counter-secession 
efforts. It seems highly unlikely that any country would recognise the 
TRNC knowing that it would face inevitable and strong consequences in 
terms of its relations with the EU.
3) Stop legitimisation
While stopping formal recognition is a key plank of any counter-
recognition strategy, states also need to guard against the gradual 
acceptance of a breakaway territory on the international stage. In some 
ways, this is really a far bigger problem than recognition. Speaking 
to Cypriot officials, they do not believe that the TRNC will ever gain 
widespread formal recognition. One or two states may recognise it, but 
it will never join the UN. What worries them far more is that it will slowly 
become a de facto reality and that it will gain recognition in all but 
name. 
Such creeping legitimisation can happen in all sorts of ways. And 
nothing is seemingly too small to oppose. For example, there have been 
many occasions when word has leaked that a major international singer 
is booked to perform in Northern Cyprus, at which point a concerted 
effort is made to persuade them to abandon their performance. In 
this effort, the government is often supported by the vast army of the 
Cypriot diaspora, which is often happy to use its influence to persuade 
the hapless pop star to back down. However, acceptance can come in 
all sorts of other ways, such as allowing Turkish Cypriot sportsmen and 
women to compete in competitions, or even through cultural visits. It is 
telling just how utterly determined the Cypriot government is when it 
comes to such matters. 
4) Pursue legal avenues
The fourth main strand of any counter-secession strategy is the use 
of legal avenues to prevent the recognition of breakaway territories. 
Perhaps the most obvious such example was the decision of the Serbian 
government to refer Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence 
to the International Court of Justice. While the Cypriot government 
participated in this process, and made a strong case against Kosovo, 
it has so far refrained from taking such a high-profile course of action 
itself. This is largely because it has no need to do so. UN Security 
Council Resolution 541 (1983), passed at the time of the Turkish Cypriot 
declaration of independence, provides all the necessary cover. As one 
Cypriot official noted to the author, international courts can be very 
unpredictable bodies. The risk of taking a case before such bodies unless 
necessary is just too high.
However, Cyprus has shown how international courts can be extremely 
important in counter-secession efforts in other ways. Perhaps the best 
example was a case brought before the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) by a Greek Cypriot refugee. The court ruled that the 
refugee had not only been illegally deprived of the rightful use of her 
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land, it also noted that Northern Cyprus is under Turkish occupation. This 
was a huge victory for the Greek Cypriots. In one fell swoop, the ECHR 
not only further undermined any claim to legitimacy by the TRNC, it also 
reinforced the Greek Cypriot message that Northern Cyprus is not a 
product of Turkish Cypriot self-determination, but is the result of external 
military aggression. It is a message that other states facing secessionist 
challenges, such as Georgia, have also sought to emulate. 
Present and future counter-secession efforts
While the Cypriot government has had remarkable success in its 
efforts to prevent the recognition or legitimation of Northern Cyprus – 
especially considering the size and diplomatic clout of Turkey, the TRNC’s 
main patron – there has undoubtedly been a change in international 
attitudes towards the Turkish Cypriots over the years. Perhaps the 
most significant development was the Greek Cypriot rejection of the 
2004 UN proposal for reunification. Although this did not lead to any 
formal recognitions, as some Greek Cypriots claimed could happen, it 
did change wider international attitudes towards the Turkish Cypriots. 
The EU moved to open trade with them, although plans for direct trade 
were thwarted by Greek Cypriots. At the same time, the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) upgraded the standing of the “Turkish Cypriot 
state”, and has called on its members to increase their economic and 
cultural contacts with the Turkish Cypriots. Meanwhile, the election of 
a more moderate leadership in the north has also seen more diplomats 
accredited to the Republic of Cyprus crossing the line that divides 
the two communities and engaging with Turkish Cypriot officials 
and political figures – much to the evident annoyance of the Cypriot 
government. Certainly, Northern Cyprus is far less isolated today than it 
was fifteen or twenty years ago.
But in so many other ways, the Turkish Cypriots remain cut off from the 
wider international community. As noted, the prospects of any further 
recognitions remain dim, even after the collapse of the latest UN talks. 
Of course, it is always possible that some state might be persuaded to 
take the plunge. However, it seems unlikely that many would really do 
so. The costs would be too high. Also, repeated efforts to try to ease 
the position of the Turkish Cypriots in other ways fall on deaf ears. 
There is little prospect that Turkish Cypriot football clubs will be allowed 
to compete in international competitions. This in fact highlights the 
greatest danger now facing the Greek Cypriots. Given that there is 
little prospect that the TRNC will ever be able to ease its isolation, and 
that many Turkish Cypriots now believe that the Greek Cypriots have 
no real desire for reunification, perhaps the only realistic prospect is for 
the north to unite with Turkey. If so, Cyprus will be faced with a rather 
different problem. It will no longer be engaged in counter-secession. It 
will have to formulate a counter-annexation strategy.

